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Abstract
Modern approaches to pose and body shape estima-
tion have recently achieved strong performance even under
challenging real-world conditions. Even from a single im-
age of a clothed person, a realistic looking body shape can
be inferred that captures a users’ weight group and body
shape type well. This opens up a whole spectrum of ap-
plications – in particular in fashion – where virtual try-on
and recommendation systems can make use of these new
and automatized cues. However, a realistic depiction of
the undressed body is regarded highly private and therefore
might not be consented by most people. Hence, we ask if the
automatic extraction of such information can be effectively
evaded. While adversarial perturbations have been shown
to be effective for manipulating the output of machine learn-
ing models – in particular, end-to-end deep learning ap-
proaches – state of the art shape estimation methods are
composed of multiple stages. We perform the first investi-
gation of different strategies that can be used to effectively
manipulate the automatic shape estimation while preserv-
ing the overall appearance of the original image.
1. Introduction
Since the early attempts to recognize human pose in im-
ages [64, 18], we have seen a transition to real-world appli-
cations where methods operate on challenging real-world
conditions in uncontrolled pose and lighting. We have seen
more recently progress towards extracting richer represen-
tations beyond the pose. Most notably, a full body shape
that is represented by a 3D representation or a low dimen-
sional manifold (SMPL) [32]. It has been shown that such
representations can be obtained from fully clothed persons
– even in challenging conditions from a single image [7] as
well as from web images of a person [49].
On the one hand, this gives rise to various applications –
most importantly in the fashion domain. The more accurate
judgment of fit could minimize clothing returns, and avatars
and virtual try-on may enable new shopping experiences.
Figure 1: A realistic depiction of the undressed body is con-
sidered highly private and therefore might not be consented
by most people. We prevent automatic extraction of such
information by small manipulations of the input image that
keep the overall aesthetic of the image.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that such technology already
sees gradual adaption in businesses1, as well as start-ups 2.
On the other hand, the automated extraction of such
highly personal information from regular, readily available
images might equally raise concerns about privacy. Images
contain a rich source of implicit information that we are
gradually learning to leverage with the advance of image
processing techniques. Only recently, the first organized at-
tempts were made to categorize private information in im-
ages [42] to raise awareness and to activate automatic pro-
tection mechanisms.
To control and control private information in images, a
range of redaction and sanitization techniques have been in-
troduced [41, 54, 58]. For example, evasion attacks have
been used to disable classification routines to avoid extrac-
tion of information. Such techniques use adversarial pertur-
bations to throw off a target classifier. It has been shown
that such techniques can generalize to related classifiers
[39], or can be designed under unknown/black-box models
[36, 11, 8, 53, 27].
Unfortunately, such techniques are not directly applica-
ble to state-of-the-art shape estimation techniques [7, 3, 31,
2, 21], as they are based on multi-stage processing. Typi-
cally, deep learning is used to extract person keypoints, and
1https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-buys-body-labs-a-3d-body-
scanning-tech-startup/
2https://bodylabs.io/en/
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a model-fitting/optimization stage leads to the final keypoint
estimation of pose and shape. As a consequence, there is no
end-to-end architecture that would allow the computation of
an image gradient needed for adversarial perturbations.
Today, we are missing successful evasion attacks on
shape extraction methods. In this paper, we investigate to
what extent shape extraction can be avoided by small ma-
nipulations of the input image. We follow the literature on
adversarial perturbations and require our changes in the in-
put image to be of a small Euclidean norm. After analyz-
ing a range of synthetic attack strategies that operate at the
keypoints level, we experimentally evaluate their effective-
ness to throw off multi-stage methods that include a model
fitting stage. These attacks turn out to be highly effective
while leaving the images visually unchanged. In summary,
our contributions are:
• An orientative user study of concerns w.r.t. privacy
and body shape estimation in different application con-
texts.
• Analysis of synthetic attacks on 2D keypoint detec-
tions.
• A new localized attack on keypoint feature maps that
require smaller noise norm for the same effectiveness.
• Evaluation of overall effectiveness of different attacks
strategies on shape estimation. We show the first suc-
cessful attacks that offer an increase in privacy with
negligible loss in visual quality.
2. Related Works
This work relates to 3D human shape estimation meth-
ods, privacy, and adversarial image perturbation techniques.
We will here cover recent papers in these three domains and
some of the key techniques directly relating to our approach.
Privacy and Computer Vision. Recent developments in
computer vision techniques [15, 30, 24, 37], increases con-
cerns about extraction of private information from visual
data such as age [6], social relationships [62], face detec-
tion [55, 60], landmark detection [68], occupation recogni-
tion [51], and license plates [70, 67, 10]. Hence several
studies on keeping the private content in visual data be-
gan only recently such as adversarial perturbations [33, 43],
automatic redaction of private information[41], predicting
privacy risks in images [42], privacy-preserving video cap-
ture [1, 45, 35, 48], avoiding face detection [63, 22], full
body re-identification [38] and privacy-sensitive life log-
ging [25, 29]. None of the previous work in this domain
studied the users shape privacy preferences. Hence, we
present a new challenge in computer vision aimed at pre-
venting automatic 3D shape extraction from images.
3D Body Shape Estimation. Recovery of 3D human
shape from a 2D image is a very challenging task due to
ambiguities such as depth and unknown camera data. This
task has been facilitated by the availability of 3D genera-
tive body models learned from thousands of scans of peo-
ple [4, 47, 32], which capture anthropometric constraints
of the population and therefore reduce ambiguities. Sev-
eral works [49, 52, 20, 69, 12, 7, 26, 23, 69] leverage these
generative models to estimate 3D shape from single or mul-
tiple images, using shading cues, silhouettes and appear-
ance. Recent model based approaches are using deep learn-
ing based 2D detections [9] – by either fitting a model to
them at test time [2, 49, 7, 3, 21] or by using them to super-
vise bottom-up 3D shape predictors [40, 44, 28, 59, 57, 2].
Hence, to evade recent shape estimators, we study different
strategies to attack the 2D keypoint detections while pre-
serving the overall appearance of the original image.
Adversarial Image Perturbation. Adversarial exam-
ples for deep neural networks were first reported in [56, 19]
demonstrating that deep neural networks are being vulner-
able to small adversarial perturbations. This phenomenon
was analyzed in several studies [5, 65, 16, 50, 17], and dif-
ferent approaches have been proposed to improve the ro-
bustness of neural networks [43, 13]. Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) and several variations of it were intro-
duced in [19, 34] for generating adversarial examples that
are indistinguishable–to the human eye–from the original
image, but can fool the networks. However, these tech-
niques do not apply to state of the art body shape estima-
tion as those are based on multi-stage processing. Typically,
shape inference consists in fitting a body model to detected
skeleton keypoints. Consequently, we perturb the 2D key-
points to produce an error in the shape fitting step. Cisse
et al. [14], proposed a method to fool 2D pose estimation.
None of these techniques propose a solution to evade model
based shape estimation. In order to evade 3D shape estima-
tion in a subtle manner, we attack by removing and flipping
individual keypoints. Since these attacks simulate typical
failure modes of detectors (miss-detections due to occlusion
and keypoint flips), they are more difficult to identify by the
defender.
3. Understanding Users Shape Privacy Prefer-
ences
Modern body shape methods [49, 7, 40, 28] infer a real-
istic looking 3D body shape from a single photo of a per-
son. The estimated 3D body captures user weight group and
body shape type. However, such a realistic depiction of the
undressed body is considered highly private and therefore
might not be consented by most people. We performed a
user study to explore the users’ personal privacy preferences
related to their body shape data. Our goal was to study the
degree to which various users are sensitive to sharing their
shape data such as height, different body part measurement,
and their 3D body shape in different contexts. This study
2
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Figure 2: Participants were asked to indicate their comfort
level for sharing these images publicly, considering they are
the subject in these images.
Gender
Pose of the person
Age
Fashion style
Personality traits
Circumferences of the bust
3D body shape information
Identity of the person
Nationality
circumferences of the waist
Level of education
Location of the image
Healthiness
Circumferences of the hips
Clothing size such as medium, small, ...
Body mass index (BMI)
None of above
Weight
Attributes:
Figure 3: In Question 2 participants were shown this im-
age, and were asked to select the attributes from the list that
could be extracted.
was approved by our university’s ethical review board and
is described next.
User Study. We split the survey into three parts. In the
first part of the survey, our goal was to understand users
image sharing preferences and the user’s knowledge of what
type of information could be extracted from a single image.
Part1-Question 1: Users are shown Figure 2 without the
3D shape data. Participants are asked how comfortable they
are sharing such images publicly, considering they are the
subject in these images. Responses are collected on a scale
of 1 to 5, where: (1) Extremely comfortable, (2) Slightly
comfortable, (3) Somewhat comfortable, (4) Not comfort-
able, and (5) Extremely uncomfortable.
Part1-Question 2: Participants were shown Figure 3, and
were asked which attributes could be extracted from this
image.
In the second part, users were introduced to 3D shape
models by showing them images of 8 people along with
their 3D body shape, as shown in Figure 4. The purpose of
part 2 was to understand the user’s perceived closeness of
extracted 3D shapes to the original images, and their level
of comfort with them.
Part2-Question 3: Participants were asked to rate how
close the estimated 3D shape is to the person in the image.
Responses are collected on a scale of 1 to 5, where: (1)
Untrue of the person in the image, (2) somewhat untrue of
the person in the image, (3) Neutral, (4) Somewhat true of
Figure 4: Participants were asked to judge the closeness of
the depicted 3D shape to the actual body of the person in
the images.
the person in the image, and (5) True of the person in the
image.
Part2-Question 4: Participants were shown Figure 2
asked to indicate how comfortable they are sharing such a
photograph along with 3D shape data publicly, considering
they are the subject in these images. We collected responses
on a scale of 1 to 5, similar to Question 1.
In the third part of this survey, we explore users prefer-
ences on what type of body shape information they would
share for applications such as (a) Health insurance, (b) Body
scanners at airport, (c) Online shopping platforms, (d) Dat-
ing platforms, and (e) Shape tracking applications ( for
sport, fitness, ...).
Part3-Question 5: Users were asked their level of com-
fort on a scale of 1 to 5 for the applications mentioned
above.
Participants. We collect responses of 90 unique users in
this survey. Participants were not paid to take part in this
survey. Out of the 90 respondents, 43.3% were female,
55.6% were male, and 1.1% were queer. The dominant age
range of our participants (63.3%) was in 21-39, followed by
30-39 (23.3%). Participants have a wide range of education
level, where 46.7% has master degree, 21.1% has bachelor
degree3.
Analysis. The results of Part1-Question 1 and Part2-
Question 4 are shown in Figure 5a. We see that majority
of the users do not feel comfortable or they feel extremely
uncomfortable (36%, 30%) sharing their 3D data publicly
compared to sharing only their images (29%, 14%).
In Part1-Question 2, the top three selected attributes
were: gender (98.9%), pose (87.8%), and age (85.6%).
Shape related attributes such as body mass index (BMI)
(47.8%), weight (63.3%), and 3D body shape (66.7%) were
3Further details on participants demographic data are presented in the
supplementary materials.
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Figure 5: (a) Comfort level of participants in sharing images
with and without 3D mesh data, considering they are the
subject in these images. (b) Comfort level of the participant
for sharing their 3D mesh data with multiple applications.
Results are shown as the percentage of times an answer is
chosen.
not in the top selected attributes, indicating that many par-
ticipants were unaware that such information could be ex-
tracted from an image using automatic techniques.
In Part3-Question3, users were asked to judge the qual-
ity of the presented 3D models. Around 43% of the par-
ticipants believe the presented shape is Somewhat true of
the person in the image, and 31% thinks the 3D mesh is
true to the person in the picture. This indicates that recent
approaches can infer perceptually faithful 3D body shapes
under clothing from a single image.
Figure 5b presents the results from Part3-Question 5.
Participants show a high level of discomfort in sharing their
3D shape data for multiple applications. In all investigated
applications except for fitness, the majority of the users re-
sponded with ”discomfort of some degree”.
The user study demonstrates that users are concerned
about the privacy of their body shape. Consequently, we
present next a framework to prevent 3D shape extraction
from images.
4. Shape Evasion Framework
Model-based shape estimation methods from a 2D image
are based on a two-stage approach. First, a neural network
is used to detect a set of 2D body keypoints, then a 3D body
model fits the detected keypoints. Since this approach is
not end-to-end, it does not allows direct computation of the
image gradient needed for adversarial perturbation. To this
end, we approach the shape evasion by attacking the key-
points detection network. In section 4.1, we give a brief
introduction on model-based shape estimation method. In
section 4.2, we introduced a local attack that allows targeted
attacks on keypoints. Figure 6 shows an overview of our ap-
proach.
4.1. Model Based Shape Estimation
A Skinned Multi-Person Linear Model (SMPL) [32] is a
state of the art generative body model. The SMPL function
M(β,θ), uses shape β and poses θ to parametrize the sur-
face of the human body that is represented using N = 6890
vertices. The shape parameters β ∈ R10 encode changes
in height, weight and body proportions. The body pose
θ ∈ R3P , is defined by a skeleton rig with P = 24 key-
points. The 3D skeleton keypoints are predicted from body
shape via J(β). We can use a global rigid transform Rθ
To pose the SMPL keypoint. Hence, Rθ(J(β)i) denotes a
posed 3D keypoint i. In order to estimated 3D body shape
from a 2D image I , several works [49, 7, 31], minimizes an
objective function composed of a keypoint-based data term,
pose priors, and a shape prior.
E(β,θ) = EPθ (θ) +EPβ (β) +EJ(β,θ;K,Jest) (1)
where EPθ (θ), and EPβ (β) are the pose and shape prior
terms as described in [7]. The EJ(β,θ;K,Jest) is the
keypoint-based data term which penalizes the weighted 2D
distance between estimated 2D keypoints, Jest, and the pro-
jected SMPL body keypoint Rθ(J(β)):
EJ(β,θ;K,Jest) =
∑
keypointi
wiρ(ΠK(Rθ(J(β)i))−Jest,i)
(2)
where ΠK is the projection from 3D to 2D of the camera
with parameters K and ρ a Geman-McClure penalty func-
tion which is robust to noise in the 2D keypoints detec-
tions. wi indicates the confidence of each keypoints esti-
mate, provided by 2D detection method. For cases such as
occluded or missing keypoints, w is very low, and hence the
data term will be driven by pose prior term. Furthermore,
the prior term avoids impossible poses. Shape evasion can
be achieved by introducing error in 2D keypoints detection
Jest. We use Adversarial perturbation to fool the pose de-
tection method by either removing a keypoint or filliping
two keypoints with each other.
4.2. Adversarial Image Generation
The state of the art 2D pose detection methods uses a
neural network f parametrized by φ, to predict a set of
4
Figure 6: The summary of our framework. We assume that we have full access to the parameter of the network. The attacker
breaks the detections by removing or flipping of a keypoint. Hence the final estimated shape does not depict the person in the
image.
2D locations of anatomical keypoints Jest for each person
in the image. The network produces a set of 2D confi-
dence maps S = {S1,S2,S3, ...,SP }, where Si ∈ Rw×h
, i ∈ 1, 2, 3, ..., P , is a confidence map for the keypoints i
and P is total number of Keypoints. Assuming that a sin-
gle person is in the image, then each confidence map con-
tains a single peak if the corresponding part is visible. The
final set of 2D keypoints Jest are achieved by performing
non-maximum suppression per each confidence map. These
confidence maps are shown in Figure 6.
To attack a keypoint we used adversarial perturbation.
Adding adversarial perturbation a to an image I will causes
a neural network to change its prediction[56].The adversar-
ial perturbation a is defined as the solution to the optimiza-
tion problem
arg min
a
‖a‖2 + L(f(I + a;φ),S∗). (3)
L is the loss function between the network output and de-
sired confidence maps S∗.
Removing and Flipping of Keypoints: The S∗ is de-
fined for removing and flipping of keypoints. to re-
move a keypoint, we put its confidence map to zero.
For example if we are attacking the first keypoint we
have: S∗ = {S1 = 0,S2,S3, ...,SP }. To flip two key
points we exchanged the values of two confidence map
as Si,Sj = Sj ,Si. In case i, j = 2, 3 we have S∗ =
{S1,S3,S2, ...,SP }. An example of removing and flipping
of the keypoint is shown in Figure 6.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [19]: FGSM is a
first order optimization schemes used in practice for Equa-
tion 3, which approximately minimizes the `∞ norm of per-
turbations bounded by the parameter . The adversarial ex-
amples are produced by increasing the loss of the network
on the input I as
Iadv = I +  sign(∇IL(f(I;φ),S∗)). (4)
We call this type of attack global as the perturbation is ap-
plied to the whole image. This perturbation results in poses
with several missing keypoints or poses outside of natural
human pose manifold. While this will often make the sub-
sequent shape optimization step fail (Eq. (2)), the approach
has two limitations: i) this attack requires a large pertur-
bation and ii) the attack is very easy to identify by the de-
fender.
Masked Fast Gradient Sign Method (MFGSM): To
overcome the limitations of the global approach, we intro-
duced Masked FGSM. This allows for localized perturba-
tion for more targeted attacks. This method will generate
poses, which are close to ground truth pose, yet have a miss-
ing keypoint that will cause shape evasion–while requiring
smaller perturbations as shown in the experiments. We will
refer to this scheme as “local” in the rest of the paper. To at-
tack a specific keypoint we solve the following optimization
problem in a iterative manner as:
Iadv0 = I
Iadvt+1 = clip(I
adv
t −α · sign(∇Iadvt L(f(Iadvt ;φ),S
∗)M), )
(5)
where mask M ∈ Rw×h is used to attack a keypoint Jest,i ∈
R2 selectively. M is defined as:
M =
{
1 if (x− Jest,i)2 = r2
0
r controls the spread of the attack and x ∈ R2 are the pixel
coordinates. To ensure the max norm constraint of pertur-
bation a being no greater than  is preserved, the clip(z, )
is used, which keeps the values of z in the range[z−, z+].
5. Experiments
The overall goal of the experimental section is to provide
an understanding and the first practical approach to evade
body shape estimation and hence protect the privacy of the
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Attack Right ankle Right knee Right hip Left hip Left knee Left ankle Right wrist Right elbow Right shoulder Left shoulder Left elbow Left wrist Head top Average
Real 1.32 1.4 1.39 1.37 1.38 1.32 1.36 1.41 1.40 1.35 1.28 1.37 1.35 1.37
Synthetic 1.17 1.18 1.79 1.94 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.43 1.49 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.32
Table 1: Shape estimation error on 3DPW with Procrustes analysis with respect to the ground truth shape. Error in cm. The
goal of each attack is to induce bigger error in the estimated shape. Hence, higher errors are indication of a successful attack.
user. We approach this by systematically studying the ef-
fect of attacking keypoint detections on the overall shape
estimation pipeline. First, we study synthetic attacks based
on direct manipulation of keypoints locations, where we can
observe the effects on body shape estimation in an idealized
scenario. This study is complemented by real image-based
attacks which make keypoint estimation fail. Together, we
evaluate our approach that provides the first and effective
defence against body shape estimation on real-world data.
Dataset. We used 3D Poses in the Wild Dataset (3DPW)
[61], which includes 60 sequences with 7 actors. To achieve
ground truth shape parameter β, actors were scanned and
SMPL was non-rigidly fit to them to obtain their 3D models
similar to [46, 66]. To the best of our knowledge, 3DPW
is the only in wild image dataset which provides the ground
truth shape data as well, which makes this dataset most suit-
able for our evaluation. For our evaluation, for each actor,
we randomly selected multiple frames from different se-
quences. All reported results are averaged across subjects
and sampled sequence frames– the exact sampled frames
are specified in the supplementary material.
Model. We used OpenPose [9] for keypoint detection as
it is the most widely used. OpenPose consists of a two-
branch multi-stage CNN, which process images at multi-
scales. Each stage in the first branch predicts the confidence
map S, and each stage in the second branch predicts the Part
Affinity Fields (PAFs). For the shape estimation, we used
the public code of Smplify [7], which infers a 3D mesh by
fitting the SMPL body model to a set of 2D keypoints. To
improve the 3D accuracy, we refined the estimations using
silhouette as described in [49]. We used MFGSM (Eq. (5)
with α = 1) in an iterative manner. We evaluated attacks
when setting the `∞ norm of the perturbations to  = 0.035
since we observed that higher values lead to noticeable ar-
tifacts in the image. We stop the iterations if we reach an
Euclidean distance (between the original and perturbed im-
ages) of 0.02 in image space for local, and 0.04 for global
attacks.
5.1. Synthetic Modification of The keypoints
First, we studied the importance of each keypoint on the
overall body shape estimation by removing one keypoint
at a time–which simulate miss-detections. The error on
shape estimation caused by this attack is reported in the sec-
ond row of Table 1. We observe that removing“Hips”, and
“Shoulder” keypoints results in the highest increase of error
of 34%, and 25.86% whereas ”Elbows” and ”Wrists” result
in an increase of only 1%.
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Figure 7: Shape estimation error on 3DPW with Procrustes
analysis. Error in cm for synthetic and real flipping of the
keypoints.
We also studied the effect of flipping keypoints. The re-
sults of this experiment are shown in Figure 7. Flipping the
“Head” with the left or right“Hip” caused an increase in er-
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Figure 8: The overall shape estimation error induced by
synthetic and real (local) attacks. The darker and bigger
circles shows higher error.
ror of 143.96%. Flipping the “ Elbow” and “Knee” was the
second most effective attack causing 67% increase of error
in average. The least effective attack was by flipping the left
and right knee (2.58%). The average error introduced by re-
moving or flipping of each keypoint is illustrated in Figure 8
– higher error is larger in size and darker in colour. We can
see that, overall “Hip”, “Shoulder”, and “Head” keypoints
play a crucial role in the quality of the final estimated 3D
mesh, and are the most powerful attacks.
5.2. Attacking keypoint Detection by Adversarial
Image Perturbation
To apply modifications to the keypoints, we used our
proposed local Mask Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(MIFGSM). Figure 9 shows the keypoint confidence map
values when removing and adding a keypoint using local
and global attacks with respect to the amount of perturba-
tion added to the image. We can see that the activation’s
per each keypoint decreases after each iteration. Interest-
ingly, the rate of decrease is slower for global attacks for
the same amount of perturbation (0.015 Mean Squared Er-
ror (MSE) between perturbed and original image). Global
attacks require much higher amount of perturbations (0.035
MSE) to be successful, causing visible artifact in the image.
We observed similar behavior when adding a ”fake” key-
point detections (required to flip two keypoints). Similarly,
the rate of increase in activation was slower for global com-
pared to local for the same amount of perturbation (0.015
MSE, blue bar in the plot). From Figure 9 we can also see
that shoulders and head are more resistant to the removal.
Furthermore, the attack was the most successful in the cre-
ation of wrists. Since local attacks are more effective, we
consider only the local attack method for further analysis.
5.3. Shape Evasion
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the whole
approach for evading shape estimation and therefore, pro-
tecting the users’ privacy. We used our proposed local
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Figure 9: Comparison of local and global attacks for remov-
ing and adding a keypoint. The local attack has a higher rate
of decrease or increase of activation compared to the global
method for the same amount of perturbation. The blue bar
on the global plots shows the end of the local methods.
method to remove and flip keypoints instead of the syn-
thetic modification of the keypoints as described in section
5.1. Hence, we call this attack as a real modification of key-
points.
The error on shape estimation caused by removing of the
keypoints using our local method are reported in the first
row of Table 1, we refer to it as real. We see that attacks
on “Right Elbow” and “Right knee” causes 21% increase
of error in shape estimation. The least amount of error 10%
and 13% was produced by removing “Left Elbow” and ”An-
kles” respectively. However, “Hip” and “Shoulder” gained
higher error in average for left and right keypoint by 18%.
On average, the real attack for removing keypoints caused
an even higher error than the synthetic mode (18% to 13%),
showing the effectiveness of this approach in shape evasion
and hence protecting the users’ privacy.
The result for flipping the keypoints is shown in Fig-
ure 7 (Real modification of the keypoint). The highest in-
crease in error was (14%) caused by flipping the “Head”
with “Left Hip”, the second most effective attack was for
flipping the “Shoulder” and “Knee” keypoints (12% in aver-
age over left and right keypoints). The least effective attack
was on “wrist” with increase of 2% error on average.
Real flipping of keypoints achieves an error of (3%)
compared to real removing attacks (18%), which shows
they are slightly less effective. In addition, similar to global
attacks, filliping of keypoints causes more changes in the
keypoints, making the detection of these attacks easier.
5.4. Qualitative Results
In Figure 10, we present example results obtained for
each type of attack. The global attack causes pose estima-
tion to hallucinate multiple people in the image, destroying
the body signal of the person in the picture. As the predicted
poses in the global attack are not in human body manifold,
the optimization step in SMPL will fail to fit these keypoints
resulting in average shape estimates. In the local attack, we
were able to apply small changes in the keypoints. Hence,
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Figure 10: The left side shows the original image with the
estimated pose, and the right the output when modified with
local and global adversarial perturbations with correspond-
ing error heatmaps with respect to ground truth shapes (red
means > 2cm). Here we applied local and global attack for
removing the “Right Hip”, and flipping the “ Right Hip” and
’Head Top”. The global attack causes the pose estimation
to hallucinate multiple people in the image, while or local
attack only changes the selected keypoints. The predicted
shape in case of a global attack is always close to the aver-
age template of SMPL causing a lower error for people with
an average shape.
these small changes make the shape optimization stage pre-
dict shapes that are not average and also not close to the
person in the image. Overall, shape evasion was most suc-
cessful when removing the keypoints than flipping them,
and when using the local attacks.
6. Discussion
As our study of privacy on automatically extracted body
shapes and method for evading shape estimation is the first
of its kind, it serves as a starting point – but naturally needs
further investigations to extend on both lines of research that
we have touched on. The following presents a selection of
open research questions.
Targeted vs untargeted shape evasion. While our
method for influencing the keypoints detection is targeted,
the overall approach to shape evasion remains untargeted.
Depending on the application scenario, a consistent change
or particular randomization of the change in shape might be
desired, which is not addressed by our work.
Effects of adversarial training. It is well known that ad-
versarial training against particular image perturbations can
lead to some robustness against such attacks [56, 39] and
in turn, the attack can again be made to some extent robust
against such defences. Preventing this cat-mouse-game is
subject of on-going research and – while very important –
we consider outside of the scope of our first demonstration
of shape evasion methods.
Scope of the user study. While our user study encom-
passes essential aspects of privacy of body shape informa-
tion, clearly a more detailed understanding can be help-
ful to inform the design evasion techniques and privacy-
preserving methodologies that comply with the users’ ex-
pectations on handling personal data. As our study shows
that such privacy preferences are personal as well as appli-
cation domain specific, there seem ample opportunities to
leverage the emerging methods of high-quality body shape
estimation in compliance with user privacy.
7. Conclusion
Methods for body shape estimation from images of
clothed people are getting more and more accurate. Hence
we have asked the timely question to what extent this raises
privacy concerns and if there are ways to evade shape es-
timation from images. To better understand the privacy
concerns, we conduct a user study that sheds light on the
privacy implication as well as the sensitivity of shape data
in different application scenarios. Overall, we observe a
high sensitivity, which is also dependent on the use case
of the data. Based on this understanding, we follow up
with a defence mechanism that can hamper or even prevent
body shape estimation from real-world images. Today’s
state of the art body shape estimation approaches are fre-
quently optimization based and therefore don’t lend them-
selves to gradient-based adversarial perturbation. We tackle
this problem by a two-stage approach that first analysis the
effect of individual keypoints on the shape estimate and then
proposes adversarial image perturbations to influence the
keypoints. In particular, our novel localized perturbation
techniques constitute an effective technique to evade body
shape estimation at negligible changes to the original im-
age.
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